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Managing Contribution and Capital Market Risk in a Funded Public
Defined Benefit Plan: Impact of CVaR Cost Constraints
Raimond Maurer, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Ralph Rogalla

1. Introduction
Traditional PAYGO public pension plans confront demographic aging in most developed nations, and some policymakers advocate boosting funding to ease the crunch of paying
for the future pension liability. In the case of civil servant pensions, a handful of these have
substantial assets including in the Netherlands (ABP 2006) and the state of California
(Mitchell et al. 2001). But more generally, and in Germany in particular, civil servants are
often promised a non-contributory, tax-sponsored defined benefit (DB) pension which is usually not funded. This study evaluates the impact of an alternative approach to public sector
pension fund management, by deriving optimal contribution rate and asset allocation patterns
in a partially funded scheme for the German federal state of Hesse. We show this approach
can be useful in permitting a state to finance its public pensions so as to cut costs for taxpayers and enhance pension security for participants.
Plan sponsors are generally concerned with two types of risk, namely contribution rate
and solvency risk (Lee 1986; Haberman, Butt, and Megaloudi 2000). When managing the
funded pension, plan sponsors and beneficiaries wish to insure that plan funds will be sufficient to cover pension liabilities, while ideally smoothing contribution rates over time. To
combine both types of risk, traditional studies on managing DB pensions have introduced a
quadratic cost criterion as the plan manager’s objective function (c.f. Haberman and Sung
1994, 2005; Haberman 1997a,b; Ngwira and Gerrard 2007; and Owadally and Haberman
2004). These risks are typically measured by squared deviations of current contribution rates
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and funding levels from their expected or notional values.1 Another approach adopts a Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) criterion as a key risk measure used for plan control: the
CVaR of a parameter at the α percent confidence level is defined as the parameter’s expectation under the condition that its realization exceeds the Value at Risk (VaR) for that level
(Artzner et al. 1997, 1999; Rockafellar and Uryasev 2002). For instance, Bogentoft, Romeijn,
and Uryasev (2001) include CVaR constraints on funding levels while seeking to minimize
total costs of pension funding. Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2008a, b) directly minimize
the Conditional Value at Risk of total pension costs, while Haberman et al. (2003a, b) investigate the trade-off between mean shortfall risk (i.e. CVaR on plan solvency) and excess contribution rate risk.
In this paper, we identify contribution and investment strategies that minimize pension contribution rate risk (as in Haberman, Butt, and Megaloudi 2000), and we also impose
CVaR restrictions on total plan costs appropriate to a public pension scheme.2 Focusing on
the CVaR of the stochastic present value of plan costs offers an elegant and objective way to
compare different intertemporal contribution and investment paths on a common basis. Moreover, this approach allows us to explicitly incorporate decisionmakers’ risk budget, by defining the maximum admissible CVaR of plan costs.
We implement our approach in the context of German civil service pension plans. To
date, only two German states have started funding a portion of their public pension liability,
depositing 20-40 percent of covered payroll to the active civil servants’ pension fund; these
investments have been mainly restricted to government bonds. To illustrate the power of our
model, we examine the Hessian public pension plan which we argue is rather representative

1

Other plan manager objectives could include expected utility from dividends paid by the pension plan or from
possible terminal surplus values (c.f. Hainaut and Devolder 2007; Detemple and Rindisbacher 2008).
2
In accordance with Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001) and others, we suggest that the decision to start prefunding an initially unfunded public pension plan requires attention to the cost risks associated with funding and
investing in capital markets. Such a strategy may be considered only if these risks can be held to acceptable
levels. Accordingly, we incorporate a restriction on the maximum size of plan costs in worst-case scenarios.
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of the public sector environment in Germany. We show that controlling only on costs requires a high regular contribution rate of about 40 percent of covered payroll. Conversely,
focusing only on contribution rate volatility yields low regular contribution rates and low-risk
asset allocations, but taxpayers are exposed to substantial risk of extraordinary but predictable transfers to cover shortfalls. Combining both approaches can produce moderate contribution rates accompanied and a substantial equity portfolio which generates acceptable contribution rate volatility while keeping total pension costs under control.
In what follows, we briefly describe the public pension on which we focus, and we
derive the value of plan liabilities and payroll-related contribution rates needed to finance
them. Section 3 outlines the plan manager’s objective function and the model underlying the
asset/liability management process. Results of our stochastic simulation study are detailed in
Section 4. A final Section concludes.

2. Valuing Public Pension Liabilities in a Non-Stochastic Framework: The German
Civil Servant Plan
German civil servants have traditionally been promised a noncontributory, taxsponsored, unfunded, and relatively generous DB-type annuity that depends on retirement
age, years in civil service, and final salary.3 In exchange for this plan, civil servants do not
participate in the national social security system nor are they covered by supplementary occupational pensions (Heubeck and Rürup 2000). Over time, civil servant pensions have become less generous: the retirement age, which had been 65, is being raised to 67, and pension
accruals have been reduced to approximately 1.79 percent of final salary per service year.
This will generate a maximum replacement rate of 71.75 percent after 40 years of service
(versus 75 percent under the old rules).
3

For a more detailed discussion of the German civil servant pension system and the dataset employed in this
study, see Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2008a,b).
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2.1 Civil Service Employee Dataset
We base our assessment of the public plan by focusing on civil servants employed by
the German federal state of Hesse. This population of civil servants is rather representative of
the approximately 1.5 million active (about 4.5% of the workforce) and 900,000 retired civil
servants in Germany as a whole.4 The dataset provided by the Hessian Statistical Office includes anonymized files on active civil servants in 2004 in Hesse reporting their age, sex,
marital status, line of service, and salary.5 There are 104,919 active civil servants in the database: the average age is 44.7 years, earning an average salary of € 39,000, and 45 percent
female. Payroll amounted to an annual €4.26 billion or 33 percent of Hesse’s annual state tax
revenues in that year.
2.2 Population Dynamics and Economic Assumptions
This analysis of a transition toward a funded pension incorporates both current employees as well as those to be hired in the future into the calculations. (Unfunded past service
liabilities are assumed to be covered from other revenue sources, as in Maurer, Mitchell, and
Rogalla 2008a, b). Projecting the civil service population requires forecasting the evolution
of age and salary for existing employees, as well as making assumptions about new hires.
Since practically speaking, employee turnover for reasons other than retirement is insignificant, we assume that all workers remain active until age 67 and reach retirement with certainty.6 Vacant positions are assumed to be filled with new recruits with a 50% chance of
being male or female. Each new worker’s entry age is set to the empirical average age of new
hires, accounting for average time spent in position-related education or service credited as
prior creditable years. New workers receive the age-related remuneration for their positions
4

These numbers include only federal and state civil servants, but not the approximately 200,000 active and
500,000 retired civil servants who worked for former state-owned (now privatized) enterprises such as the German national railway and federal mail (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2005).
5
Information on a handful of top-level civil servants, judges, and state attorneys is omitted to preserve anonymity.
6
Provisions for early retirement and disability benefits, as well as dependents’ benefits due to death in service,
must therefore be conducted separately from this analysis.
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and marital status is that of the previous position holder. Retired civil servants are represented
by the expected cash flows of the indexed life annuities they receive according to the civil
service pension benefit formula. (For married retirees we calculate indexed joint-and-survivor
annuities, assuming that both partners are of same age and opposite sex.)
To value the civil servant pension liability profiles, we use mortality tables specific to
the Hessian civil service derived by Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2008a). Future mortality
improvements are incorporated using an exponential trend function suggested by the German
Association of Actuaries (‘Zieltrend 2. Ordnung’; c.f. DAV 2004, p. 56ff.). Employing this
trend function, by 2030 the mortality of a female civil servant aged 65 will fall by 40 percent.
Inflation, salary growth, and investment returns have significant influence on pension plan
valuation and must also be considered in forecasting future benefit accruals (Hustead and
Mitchell 2001). The analysis is conducted in real terms, inasmuch as salaries and pension
benefits tend to be tied to the consumer price index; accordingly, the growth rate of real
wages and real pensions is zero. Because pension liabilities have a long duration, they are
highly sensitive to the discount rate selected. Our analysis adopts the economic approach to
pension valuation so we capitalize liabilities at the real rate on (quasi-) risk-free long-term
government bonds reflecting the state’s financing costs.7 We set the real risk-free interest rate
at 3 percent in our base case, a more conservative assumption than the nominal 8 percent employed by US state-sponsored pension plans (Novy-Marx and Rauh 2008).8 To check the
interest rate sensitivity of our findings, we also report results using a 1.5 percent a real interest rate.
7

For a detailed discussion on the differences between the economic and the actuarial approach to pension valuation, see Blake (2006, p. 77).
8
Adjusting average nominal par yields of long-term German government bonds by the average inflation rate for
the post-WWII period results in real returns of about 4 percent. The yield on European inflation indexed bonds
is currently about 2 percent. However, the markets for indexed long duration government bonds are still not well
developed, so we base our analyses on the assumption of a real discount rate of 3 percent. Moreover, the federal
state of Saxony uses a nominal discount rate of 4.75 percent for valuing their pension liabilities. Accounting for
a long-run inflation target of 2% set by the European Central Bank, this lies in range of our real 3 percent base
case discount rate.
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2.3 Deriving Future Contribution Rates
If plan sponsors seek to fund their pension scheme, they must analyze pension liability patterns so as to derive the contribution rate adequate to pay for plan liabilities. To determine the plan’s normal cost, we employ the aggregate level percentage of payroll method
which expresses total projected plan costs as a percentage of active members’ payroll
(McGill et al. 2005). Starting with the initial civil service population and developing it over
the next 50 years, we calculate the present values of future salary payments as well as future
pension payments and accruals. We conduct a discontinuance valuation as of the last period
(2053), computing the projected benefit obligation (PBO) for all outstanding pension promises.9 The ratio of the present values of pension liabilities and salary payments represents the
deterministic yearly contribution rate required to fund pension promises, expressed as a percentage of active civil servants’ payroll.10
In the base case with a 3 percent discount rate, the present value of future pension liabilities amounts to € 20.8 billion versus the present value of salary payments of € 111.5 billion. Therefore, the smoothed average contribution rate required to pay for the pension promises is 18.7 percent of salaries. Applying an alternative discount rate of 1.5 percent increases
the present value of pension liabilities to € 44.8 billion and that of salary payments to € 149.3
billion. Since pension liabilities exhibit longer duration than salary payments, decreasing discount rates will increase contribution rates – in this case, from 18.7 to 30 percent.

3. Stochastic Investment Returns and Pension Plan Funding
3.1 The Pension Manager’s Objectives and Asset/Liability Management

9

While this horizon could easily be further extended beyond 50 years, all the then-active civil servants will be
fully covered by the funded system and all retirees will receive a significant fraction of their benefits from the
funded system.
10
Throughout, we set aside the past service pension obligation accrued by current and past workers on the presumption that these will have to be handled with some other financing mechanism.
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When investment returns are stochastic, the plan manager is posited to minimize the
variability of annual plan contributions, while at the same time ensuring that (worst-case)
plan costs are kept under control. To this end, the manager is free to choose a fixed rate of
normal contributions CR as a fraction of salaries, as well as a constant allocation of plan assets to equities and bonds.11 We assume that at the beginning of each period t, the sponsor
endows the plan with regular contributions RCt based on CR and salary payments in t. These
funds are then used to pay for pensions due at time t, and any remaining plan assets are invested. At the end of every period, the plan’s funding situation is scrutinized by comparing
current plan liabilities measured by the PBOt+1 and current plan assets At+1. If plan liabilities
exceed plan funds, additional contributions will be required to re-establish the balance between assets and liabilities. On the other hand, if assets exceed liabilities, this will permit
lower contributions to the plan.
Funding deviations are reduced by amortizing the shortfall over a period ranging from
1 to 20 years, depending on the manager’s control function. In other words, we employ the
spread method described by Haberman (1997a) to determine how much additional beyond
normal costs must be added to cover underfunding. The plan’s liability at the end of period t,
i.e. PBOt+1, is calculated as:

PBOt +1 = ∑

1.79375% ⋅ τ i,t +1 ⋅ S67,i ⋅ a67,i

i

(1 + r )67 − Age

i ,t +1

,

(1)

where (for each civil servant i of Agei,t+1) τi,t+1 is the number of pensionable service years
accrued until t+1, S67,i is the projected salary at retirement age 67, a67,i is the immediate pension annuity factor at age 67, r is the discount rate, and 1.79% is the final salary-related replacement rate per pensionable service year.

11

Here, we follow Haberman et al. (2003a, p. 513) who show that pension funds tend to exhibit rather stable
asset allocations over time.
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We define ULt+1 = PBOt+1 - At+1 as the unfunded liability at the end of period t (at the
beginning of period t+1), which is to be recovered over a pre-specified time horizon m, the
spread period.12 Then, the total contribution to the plan in t+1 (Ct+1) is the sum of regular
contributions (RCt+1) and adjustment payments ADJt+1:
Ct +1 = RCt +1 + ADJ t +1,

(2)

ADJ t +1 = ANFm,r ⋅ ULt +1,

(3)

with

where ANFm,r is the annuity factor for an m-period time annuity due calculated at the discount
rate r according to
−1

⎛ m −1 1 ⎞
ANFm,r = ⎜⎜ ∑
⎟ .
i ⎟
⎝ i = 0 (1 + r ) ⎠

(4)

For simplicity, the amortization or spread period m is assumed to be the same for asset shortfalls as well as surpluses (which in practice, may not always be true; c.f. Winklevoss 1993).
Finally, we stipulate that the overall contributions Ct+1 may not be negative, i.e. that
RCt+1 ≥ - ADJt+1 . Thus negative adjustment payments are limited in each period to the current regular contributions; the manager is prohibited from withdrawing from the pension fund
for other purposes. The rationale for this is that political decisionmakers are sometimes
tempted to withdraw funds and misuse them for short-term political objectives when plans
are overfunded. We seek to avoid this by imposing structural withdrawal restrictions.
To derive the optimal investment and contribution policy for this public pension plan,
we run a Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 iterations. The optimal policy parameters for
the pension plan – the normal contribution rate CR and the equity weight x – are computed
assuming that the plan sponsor’s objective is to minimize the variance of periodic contributions around the normal contribution rate over time, under the constraint that the Conditional
12

For a discussion of optimal spread period lengths see Dufresne (1988), Haberman (1997a), and Owadally and
Haberman (1999, 2004).
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Value at Risk (CVaR) at the 1 percent level of the stochastic present value of total pension
costs TPC does not exceed a pre-specified level c. This integrates the approaches by Haberman, Butt, and Megaloudi (2000),13 who use a combined measure of contribution and funding
volatility as objective function, and Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2008a, b), who seek to
minimize the CVaR of total pension costs.
More formally, the plan manager’s optimization problem can be defined as follows:
⎡ T −1 ⎛
⎞
Ct
min E ⎢∑ ⎜⎜
− CR ⎟⎟
CR , x
⎢⎣ t =1 ⎝ Salary Paymentst
⎠
s.t.
CVaR1% (TPC ) ≤ c,

2

⎤
⎥
⎥⎦
(5)

where the constant c describes the tolerable level of worst-case pension costs, which we will
assume is determined by the deterministic pension liability derived in section 2.3 (i.e. € 20.8
billion in case of a discount rate of 3%).
Following Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2008a, b), the stochastic present value of
total pension costs TPC is calculated according to:
T

TPC = ∑
t =1

RCt + SCt (1 + ξ1 ) − Wt (1 − ξ 2 )
,
(1 + r )t

(6)

where RCt denotes regular contributions in t based on the fixed normal contribution rate CR
and the payroll in t and supplementary contributions SCt and withdrawals Wt are defined as:
⎧ ADJ t | ADJ t > 0
SCt = ⎨
0, else
⎩

⎧− ADJ t | ADJ t < 0
.
Wt = ⎨
0, else
⎩

(7)

Here r is the fixed real discount rate reflecting government’s financing costs and ξi are penalty factors on supplementary contributions and withdrawals. The α%-CVaR of TPC is defined by:

CVaRα % (TPC ) = E (TPC | TCP > VaRα % (TPC )) .
13

Specifically, we use their objective function assuming that parameters w and θ equal 1.

(8)

10
In the objective function (5), dividing current plan costs Ct by salary payments results in the
currently applicable overall rate of contributions to the plan (as a fraction of the current payroll). Their volatility around the normal contribution rate CR specified by the plan manager
can be interpreted as an ‘expected’ contribution rate in this setting. We find it natural to include upward deviations of the contribution rate in the volatility measure. This formula also
accounts for downward deviations, since setting normal contribution targets too high could
result in actual contributions always falling below target (c.f. Haberman, Butt, and Megaloudi
2000).14
Supplementary contributions and withdrawals are penalized with ξi to ensure that an
adequate normal contribution rate is set: that is, supplementary contributions of 1 Euro cost
the plan (1+ ξ1) Euros. Conversely withdrawing 1 Euro from the plan generates only (1- ξ2)
Euros. We do this to offset a common perception that public funds paid into the civil servant
pension plan are “free” money.15
3.2 Stochastic Asset Model

In order to project future asset returns on investments in equities and bonds, we rely
on the first-order vector autoregressive (VAR) model widely used in the academic and practicioner literature (Hoevenaars, Molenaar and Steenkamp 2003; Campbell, Chan and Viceira
2003; Campbell and Viceira 2005). Let yt be the vector:
⎛ rm,t ⎞
⎜ ⎟
yt = ⎜ xt ⎟
⎜s ⎟
⎝ t ⎠

14

(8)

By contrast, some studies do not account for upward deviations (e.g. Haberman et al. 2003a) or put more
emphasis on underfunding risk and over-contribution risk (e.g Chang, Tzeng, and Miao 2003).
15
For a more detailed discussion of the rationale behind the penalty factors, see Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla
(2008). Due to the spread method applied, it is likely that contribution volatility will be significant after the final
period when the plan is terminated and the discontinuance valuation undertaken. By contrast, in an ongoing
plan, existing funding deviations would be recovered over time and therefore deviations in contribution rates
would be substantially lower. To prevent artificially high contribution volatility from unduly influencing decision-making, we only take into account contribution rate variations until time T-1.
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that contains the real money market log return at time t (rm,t), the vector xt , which includes
the excess returns of equities and bonds relative to rm,t (i.e. xi,t = ri,t - rm,t), and a vector st describing state variables that predict rm,t and xt. As predictor variables we include the nominal
3-month interest rate (rnom), the dividend-price ratio (dp), and the term spread (spr).16 We
assume that the dynamics of yt are governed by an unrestricted VAR(1) according to
yt +1 = a + Byt + ε t +1

(9)

with εt+1 ~ N( 0 , Σεε ).
We calibrate the model based on quarterly logarithmic return series starting in 1973:I
and ending in 2007:I. The real money market return is defined as the difference between the
nominal log 3-month Euribor and the price inflation (for the time before Euribor was available we use the Fibor). For the log return on German equities and the corresponding log dividend-price ratios, we rely on DAX 30 time series data provided by DataStream. In deriving
the return series for the diversified bond portfolio, we rely on the approach used by Campbell
and Viceira (2002). The bond return series rn,t+1 is constructed from 10-year constant maturity yields on German bonds according to:
rn,t +1 =

1
yn −1,t +1 − Dn,t ( yn −1,t +1 − yn,t ),
4

(10)

where yn,t = ln(1+Yn,t) is the n-period maturity bond yield at time t. Dn,t is the duration, which
can be approximated by:

Dn,t =

1 − (1 + Yn,t )− n
.
1 − (1 + Yn,t )−1

(11)

Assuming a flat term structure between maturities n-1 an n, we approximate yn-1,t+1 by yn,t+1.
Excess returns are again derived by subtracting the log money market return, xb,t = rn,t – rm,t.
The yield spread is computed as the difference between the log 10-year zeros yield on Ger16
These state variables find wide acceptance in the strategic asset allocation literature (c.f. Campbell and Shiller
1988, 1991; Fama and French 1989; Campbell, Chan and Viceira 2003; Campbell and Viceira 2005; Cochrane
2005; and Brandt and Santa-Clara 2006). For a concise survey refer to Hoevenaars et al. (2008).
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man government bonds and the log 3-months Euribor, both provided by Deutsche Bundesbank.
We use quarterly data to calibrate the VAR due to a higher number of available observations, but we are interested in yearly asset returns as our liabilities are modelled on an
annual basis. To this end, we aggregate the quarterly returns generated by the asset model and
adapt parameters a and Σεε such that the moments of yearly asset returns generated by the
model presented in Table 1 reflect those of annual returns in our historic time series.17, 18
Table 1 here

4. Public Pension Plan Control in a Stochastic Framework

Next we draw on the results above to derive the optimal asset allocation and normal
contribution rate for the pension plan.
4.1 Worst-Case Pension Costs and Contribution Rate Risk

The base case scenario assumes a spread period m for any under- or overfunding of 20
years,19 a real discount rate of 3 percent to discount future pension payments, no real salary or
pension increases, and a 20 percent penalty factor for supplementary contributions ξ1 and
withdrawals ξ2, which is equivalent to 1 percent per year for the spread period.
Figure 1 shows the Conditional Value at Risk of total pension costs at the 1 percent
level for alternative normal contribution rates and asset allocations. If the normal contribution
rate is set at 0 and all plan funds are invested in bonds, this results in the worst-case pension
costs of €28.09 billion. Increasing the contribution rate but keeping the same investment

17

Our historic time series generated a mean real log return on bonds of almost 5 percent p.a. resulting in equities
yielding an excess return of only 1.5 percent. In this study we calculate with an expected return of 4 percent on
bonds, which we consider to be more appropriate over the long run.
18
The adjusted parameter estimates for quarterly data are summarized in Table 4 in the appendix.
19
Within a framework comparable to the approach taken by this paper, Haberman (1997a) finds that for a discount rate of 3 percent and depending on the level of return volatility, minimizing the volatility of contributions
requires spread periods ranging from 10 to 217 periods. However, he concludes that more practical values lie in
the range of 20 to 30 periods, of which we choose the former for our base case scenario.
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strategy has the effect of decreasing overall pension costs. This is a consequence of the penalty ξ1 levied on supplementary contributions. With no normal contributions, all pension
payments and the amortized underfunding must be financed by supplementary contributions.
Higher normal contributions that impose no additional penalty reduce the amount of more
expensive supplementary payments and therefore reduce overall worst-case plan costs.
Figure 1 here
If, however, normal contributions are set too high, pension costs again rise. In this
situation, the plan exhibits ‘structural’ overfunding: that is, excess funds are offset by reducing future contributions and even withdrawing monies, if possible. Inasmuch as withdrawals
are also punished with penalty payments (factor ξ2), this too increases costs and makes structural overfunding undesirable. For normal contributions of 40 percent and 0 percent equities,
worst-case pension costs amount to €31.96 billion.
Independent of the normal contribution rate chosen, adding equities to the plan’s portfolio will at first reduce worst-case plan costs. As fund investments become more diversified,
capital market risks resulting from an undiversified pure bond investment are reduced and the
likelihood and size of possible supplementary contributions decrease. This effect is reversed,
however, when the fraction of equities in the plan’s portfolio is set too high. The investment
is no-longer well diversified and growing capital market risks again lead to rising worst-case
pension costs. When fully invested in equities, worst-case plan costs amount to €28.05 billion
for normal contributions of 0 percent, and €32.08 billion for a contribution rate of 40 percent.
This is a striking result. Although pure equity investments are substantially riskier than pure
bond investments, worst-case pension costs in both cases are almost equal; in case of zero
normal contributions, costs are even slightly lower when holding all equities compared to the
pure bond portfolio.

14
This might seem counter-intuitive, but it is attributable to the spread method used to
amortize any over- or underfunding. In case of negative capital market shocks, a funding
shortfall is not recovered by immediate supplementary contributions but rather is filled with
small additional annual contributions.20 This leaves open the possibility that the gap could be
at least partially closed by subsequent positive developments in the capital markets. In the
event of positive capital market shocks, on the other hand, excess funds are not immediately
withdrawn in full. Substantial amounts remain in the plan for longer periods of time, creating
a buffer stock for possibly weak future investment performance. Moreover, these funds continue to be invested in the plan portfolio offering a chance of better returns in a strong market.
This argument holds particularly true in the event of low regular normal contribution rates.
Here, cashing in equity premiums is of the essence when trying to reduce expensive supplementary contributions and thereby overall pension costs.21
The positive effects of gradually amortizing funding deviations are influential when a
fund holds either pure equity or pure bonds in the portfolio. Nevertheless, the impact is
stronger when the fund holds all equity, than all bonds. If all over- or underfunding were fully
recovered in the next period (i.e. the spread period were set to 1), worst-case pension costs
for normal contributions of 0 (40) percent would amount to € 69.12 (70.77) billion in case of
a pure equity strategy, and € 37.95 (37.25) billion when fully investing in bonds.
Summarizing the results for the base case with a spread period of 20 years, we conclude that the manager seeking to control worst-case overall pension costs will select a normal contribution rate of about 20 percent and equity weights of about 40 percent.

20

This of course assumes that the plan sponsor is able and willing to sustain longer periods of the pension plan
being underfunded. As in this study the government is the plan sponsor, we take this for granted (especially
since the current system is a completely underfunded pay-as-you-go system).
21
This is in line with Josa-Fombellida and Rincón-Zapatero (2006), who find that increasing funding deficits
trigger higher risk-taking. A case in point is the underfunded US Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation which
recently announced it would move away from a mostly bond portfolio toward a 55 percent allocation in equities
and non-traditional assets. This was justified as providing “a 57 percent likelihood of full funding within ten
years, compared to 19 percent under the previous policy.” See PBGC (2008).
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Next we direct our attention to contribution rate risk. Figure 2 depicts the average annual contribution rate volatility, or the deviation of actual from normal contributions as a percent of salary payments for different contribution rates and asset allocations. For a normal
contribution rate of 0 percent and a portfolio entirely invested in bonds, the annual contribution rate volatility is 2.88 percent which falls quickly as contributions rise to around 14 percent of the payroll. A further increase in regular payments again results in rising contribution
rate volatilities which reach an annual value of 3.78 percent for a normal contribution rate of
40 percent. This pattern is intuitive since our earlier results showed that minimum volatility
(in this case constant) regular contributions of 18.7 percent of the payroll are sufficient to
fund the pension in a deterministic set-up without capital market risk. Engaging in risky investment strategies reduces the minimum volatility normal contribution rate sufficient to fund
the plan, at the price of some positive contribution rate volatility related to capital market
risks (instead of zero volatility as in the deterministic case). Lower normal contributions will
constantly require the triggering of supplementary contributions which boosts contribution
rate volatility. In turn, choosing too high a normal contribution rate leads to continuous reductions in actual contributions due to amortization of asset surpluses, which also increases
contribution rate volatility.
Figure 2 here
The impact of adding equities to the pension plan’s portfolio depends on the plan’s
funding situation. For low normal contribution rates which result in the plan being chronically underfunded, contribution rate volatility decreases with increasing equity weights. In
case of a 0 normal contribution rate, volatility drops from 2.88 percent when the plan holds
only bonds, to 2.20 percent when the entire portfolio is held in equities. If normal contribution rates are high enough to fund or even overfund the plan, contribution rate volatility rises
with increasing equity exposure. For normal contributions of 40 percent, contribution rate
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volatility will rise from 3.78 percent (pure bond investment) to 4.5 percent for all equities
portfolios, a rather moderate increase.
This behavior is again driven by the amortizing of over- or underfunding, as spreading
the inflows can substantially reduce the impact of capital market volatility. If normal contributions are low, contribution rate volatility mainly results from continuously required supplementary contributions. Investing a substantial part of the plan assets in equities may offer
the chance to cash-in on higher equity premiums and thereby reduce the need for expensive
supplementary contributions. Yet this comes at the cost of increased capital market risk. Due
to the smoothing effects of the spread method applied and the generally poor funding situation, these capital market fluctuations have only minor negative impacts on the contribution
rate volatility. These are more than compensated by contribution rate volatility reducing effects of earning higher investment returns on average.
If, in turn, the plan is sufficiently funded or even substantially overfunded, there is no
need for earning excess investment returns. On the contrary, both effects discussed above will
increase contribution rate volatility. Higher expected equity premiums will further improve
the funding situation and therefore lead to even lower actual contribution rates and increased
contribution rate volatility. In addition, possible adverse capital market shocks in combination with high levels of plan assets will cause substantial capital losses, again resulting in
increasing contribution rate volatility. For the reasons discussed above, however, the absolute
negative impact of increased capital market risk on contribution rate volatility is moderate.
If all over- or underfunding were fully recovered in a single period (i.e. the spread period were set to 1), contribution rate volatility would rise for all combinations of normal contributions and investment strategies, especially for asset allocations with high equity exposure. For normal contributions of 0 (40) percent, contribution rate volatility would come in at
6.06 (4.78) percent when fully investing in bonds, and more than twice this -- 14.59 (12.66)
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percent – in the case of a pure equity strategy. This shows that the smoothing effects of the
spread method applied are particularly beneficial in the case of low normal contributions.
Summarizing, for the base case with a spread period of 20 years, contribution rate
volatility is lowest for normal contribution rates of about 14 percent and equity weights of 0
percent.
4.2 Deriving the Optimal Contribution Rate and Asset Allocation

The discussion of worst-case pension costs and contribution rate volatility patterns in
the previous section suggests ambiguous results with respect to the optimal combination of
normal contribution rate and asset allocation. Minimizing the Conditional Value at Risk of
overall pension costs at the 1 percent level would require contributing at a normal rate of
about 20 percent and investing about 40 percent of plan assets in equities. By contrast, focusing on the volatility of the (actual) contribution rate requires normal contributions of about 14
percent and a pure bond investment allocation. Accordingly, we next derive the optimal contribution and investment strategy, so as to minimize the volatility of contributions while at the
same time controlling for worst-case pension costs.
The optimal combination of normal contribution rates and equity weights appears in
Figure 3. Two sets of indifference curves appear in the equity weight/normal contribution rate
plane. The first set of U-shaped curves, which open toward the top of the Figure, represent
combinations of normal contribution rates and equity weights that result in equal worst-case
pension costs. The 1%-CVaR of costs not to be exceeded is set to € 20.8 billion, which resembles the deterministic pension costs established in section 2.3 (black solid line). Contribution rate/equity weight combinations inside this curve result in lower worst-case pension
costs, those outside cause higher costs as indicated by the two additional indifference curves
(grey solid lines).
Figure 3 here
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Next, we seek to identify the one (feasible) normal contribution rate/equity weight
strategy that will minimize contribution rate volatility subject to lying on or inside the black
solid indifference curve representing the worst-case costs (of € 20.8 billion). To this end, Figure 3 shows a second set of U-shaped indifference curves, opening to the left of the Figure,
which represent combinations of normal contribution rates and equity weights resulting in
equal contribution rate volatilities. The black solid line combines all strategies that lead to an
average annual contribution rate volatility of 1.25 percent. Combinations inside this curve
exhibit lower, those outside higher contribution rate risk.
The optimal combination of the normal contribution rate and the equity weight can
then be determined by the point at which both black solid indifference curves are tangent to
each other. No other funding/investment combination with worst-case costs restricted to a
maximum of € 20.8 billion has lower contribution rate risk. For our base case (spread period
20 years), this optimal combination consists of contributing to the plan at a normal rate of
13.4 percent and investing plan assets in a constant-mix allocation with 40.9 percent equities
and 59.1 percent bonds.
Worst-case costs are well-controlled in this setup, but the potential benefits of this
strategy, besides relatively stable contribution rates, become obvious when looking at expected overall pension costs. These are computed at only € 3.2 billion, substantially below
plan costs in the deterministic case (i.e. € 20.8 billion). The reduction in costs may be attributed to better funding combined with a well-diversified investment strategy. With an expected annual portfolio return of 5.1 percent, investment income on plan assets regularly exceeds the discount rate of liabilities. While the single-period portfolio volatility of 11.1 percent cannot be neglected, mean reversion characteristics in the equity returns as well as the
spread method applied keep capital market risks at a tolerable level. In this environment, ex-
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cess funds are regularly built up so actual contribution rates can be reduced, and remaining
excess funds can be withdrawn, all of which will reduce overall pension costs.
Table 2 summarizes optimal contribution and investment patterns for various spread
periods. Normal contribution rates (Row 1), equity and bond weights (Rows 2-3), the average
annual contribution rate volatility (Row 4), as well as worst-case and expected pension costs
(Rows 5-6) are presented for a short-term spread period of 1 year (Column 1), for mediumterm spread periods of 10 years and our base case (spread period 20 years) (Column 2-3), as
well as for long-term spread periods of 50 and infinite years (Columns 4-5).
Table 2 here
Due to our restriction on worst-case costs, optimal strategies for all spread periods
exhibit a 1%-CVaR of pension costs of € 20.8 billion (Row 5). From Row 4 it can be seen
that contribution rate volatility declines monotonically for increasing spread periods, ranging
from 3.24 percent p.a. in the case of a 1-year spread period (Column 1) to 1.09 percent when
funding deviations are spread over an infinite horizon (Column 5). Contribution rate volatility
mainly results from capital market volatility leading to fluctuations in the plan’s funding
situation. Spreading funding deviations over longer horizons reduces the impact of short-term
capital market fluctuations on required contributions in any single period.
Apart from contribution rate volatility, one must use caution when comparing any of
the other parameters included in Table 2 across different spread periods. Looking at Row 1,
one might find it striking that optimal normal contributions first drop and later increase again
with increasing spread periods. One might surmise that there is some optimal spread period
between 1-10 years that will minimize normal contributions. The fallacy of this argument is
that we do not minimize normal contributions but rather look at the volatility of overall contributions. This argument also holds when comparing the other parameters. What can be seen,
however, is that, apart from very short spread periods, contribution and investment strategies
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that minimize contribution rate volatility are rather stable, no matter how long the chosen
spread period. If deviations are spread over 10 years (Column 2), the optimal strategy would
require to set normal contributions at 13 percent (Row 1) and invest about 42 (58) percent of
plan funds in equities (bonds; Rows 2 & 3). The extreme case of spreading funding surpluses
or shortfalls over an infinite horizon (Column 5) would call for normal contributions of 14
percent (Row 1), or only 1 percent more than in the former case. Optimal equity exposure
would drop by less than 3 percent to about 39.5 percent (Column 5, Row 2). Contribution rate
volatility (Row 4) exhibits the same characteristics, dropping only marginally from 1.38 in
case of 10 years (Column 2) to 1.09 percent for an indefinite horizon (Column 5).
4.3 Development of Contribution Rates over Time

We next turn our attention to the time path of contribution rates under the optimal
(normal) contribution and investment strategy. While the rate of normal contributions is
fixed, overall contributions in each period may deviate from the normal rate depending on the
funding situation of the pension plan.
Figure 4 depicts the expected value as well as the 95%-quantile (worst-case quantile)
of overall contributions for our base case with a spread period of 20 years and penalty factors
of 20 percent. From above, recall that the optimal fixed normal contribution rate in this case
is 13.4 percent with about 41 percent of plan funds being invested in equities (Table 2, Column 3, Rows 1 & 2). Looking at the expected overall contribution rate represented by the
solid line in Figure 4, in early years the fixed normal contribution rate is insufficient to fund
accruing pension benefits. Starting from the normal contribution rate of 13.4 percent in year
1, actual contributions rise continuously to attain a maximum of 15.19 percent in year 9.
From this point onward, overall contributions decline. With 13.09 percent, the contribution
rate drops below the fixed normal rate in year 18 for the first time and continues to fall to
about 1.4 percent toward the end of our projection.
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In the early years, the size of the funds accumulated in the plan is relatively low compared to salary payments and accruing pension benefits; for instance we above computed that
deterministic contribution rate of 18.7 percent is required to fund pension benefits using the
base discount rate of 3 percent. Initial contributions fall short of that by over 5 percentage
points (almost 30 percent). Earning an expected return of about 5 percent on the small absolute amount of plan assets does not suffice to cover that shortfall, so overall contributions
must be boosted due to the expected funding shortfall. Nevertheless, they rise slowly since
the immediate impact of the deficit on contributions is cushioned by the spread approach. As
the magnitude of fund assets rises, the approximately 2 percent excess return over the discount rate earned by investing in risky equities and bonds should cover the difference between accruing pension benefits and contributions to fund them. In turn, overall expected
contributions fall in later periods as the pension plan holds substantial assets.
Figure 4 here
Turing our attention to the 95%-quantile of overall contributions, represented by the
dashed line in Figure 4, we identify a comparable pattern. If capital markets underperform,
contributions rise to a higher level of about 21.8 percent in year 20. The decline in later years
is also substantially smaller than in expectation, with overall contributions falling short of the
normal contribution rate only from year 47 onwards and reaching a minimum of 11.6 percent
toward the end of our projection. The fact that contribution rates in later periods drop can be
attributed to mean reversion inherent in asset returns resulting in a considerable reduction of
return volatility over the long run.
Table 3 summarizes expected and 95%-quantile overall contribution rates for all
spread periods under investigation and for selected time points. In line with our earlier results, we find that the amplitude of contribution rate variation over time decreases with longer

22
spread periods. As one would anticipate, this is particularly important for the 95%-quantile of
overall contributions.
Table 3 here
Looking at expected contribution rates for a one year spread period (Table 3, Row 1),
it can be seen that these rates continuously decline over time. Starting at 23 percent in year 1
(Column 1), they drop to only 0.9 percent in the last year (Column 6). In this case, the initial
contribution rate is above the one required in the deterministic case, which immediately leads
to a reduction in contribution rates. The pension plan is well-endowed from the beginning
and expected excess returns on the assets help to reduce expected overall contributions. The
downside of missing the opportunity to smooth contributions over time becomes apparent
when looking at the 95%-quantile of contributions. These may rise to a maximum of about 60
percent around year 20 (Row 6, Column 3). Over very long horizons, however, the reduction
of long-term asset volatility kicks in again and even in 95 percent of paths no additional contributions are required (Row 6, Column 6).
For spread periods from 10 years to infinity, there are only minor differences in the
optimal contribution and investment strategy. It is therefore not surprising that contribution
rate patterns over time for all other spread periods come very close to the base case discussed
above.
4.4 Further Results

Thus far, all analyses have used the base case with a real discount rate of 3 percent,
standard expectations for equities and bonds, and penalty factors on supplementary contributions and withdrawals of ξ1 = ξ2 = 0.2. Next we vary these assumptions to explore robustness.
In the early 2000s, many pension plans faced severe financial distress due to the capital market downturn which left plan assets crumbling just when low interest rates boosted
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pension liabilities. Accordingly we next analyze how our pension plan would behave in such
a ‘perfect storm’ environment. To this end, we assume that the discount rates as well as expected returns on equities and bonds fall to 1.5 percent, and expected asset returns behave
according to the low return scenario in Table 1.
It may be recalled that under this lower discount rate, the deterministic PBO totals €
44.8 billion. Letting this be the restriction on worst-case costs and keeping the penalty factors
at ξ1 = ξ2 = 0.2, neither combination of normal contributions and investment strategies will
be able to comply with this limit at the 1%-CVaR level, for any spread period. For a spread
period of 20 years, the 1%-CVaR finds its minimum at € 46.5 billion for normal contributions
of 20 percent and an equity weight of 41 percent. In fact, the 1%-CVaR restriction can only
be met by relaxing the penalty factors for funding deviations. For instance, if ξ1 = ξ2 = 0,
there are viable solutions for all spread periods under investigation. Given a spread period of
1 year, the optimal normal contribution rate would be 16.1 percent and 23 percent of fund
assets would be held in equities; this results in contribution rate volatility of 3.73 percent p.a.
Contribution rate volatilities for other spread periods are substantially lower, ranging from
1.62 percent p.a. in case of 10 years, to 0.54 percent p.a. in case of an infinite spread period.
Nevertheless, optimal contribution and investment strategies change little. Volatilityminimizing contribution rates in these cases vary between 15.1 and 15.5 percent, while optimal equity weights lie between 27 and 29 percent. Spreading funding deviations over longer
time leads to increased tolerance for capital market volatility and therefore rising appetite for
equities. As expected return on equities still exceeds that of bonds, there is some room for
reducing contribution rates but it is small.
Conversely, if penalty factors are maintained for incentive reasons, the only way to
generate feasible solutions requires relaxing the overall worst-case cost risk tolerance. For
instance, setting the CVaR at 5 percent, and assuming ξ1 = ξ2 = 0.2 as in the base case, re-
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sults in solutions comparable to those reported previously. Optimal contribution rate volatilities are virtually unchanged. Imposing penalties on funding deviations, however, leads to
marginally higher contribution rates, varying between 16 and 17 percent for different spread
periods, and slightly reduced equity exposure, with equity weights ranging between 21 and
25 percent. Expected overall pension costs would come to € 23.88 billion, down by almost 50
percent with respect to the deterministic pension liability.
Next we turn our attention to an analysis of the impact of penalizing funding deviations with extra loadings. For the base scenario discount factor of 3 percent, standard expectations on asset returns, a spread period of 20 years and ξ1 = ξ2 = 0.2, we learned that the optimal strategy includes a normal contribution rate of 13.4 percent and an equity fraction of
40.9 percent, resulting in contribution rate volatility of 1.25 percent p.a. Cutting penalties
relaxes the restriction on worst-case costs and more combinations of normal contribution rate
and asset allocation become available to the plan manager. For penalty factors of ξ1 = ξ2 = 0,
contribution rate volatility can be reduced to 0.93 percent p.a. by only contributing at a normal rate of 11.2 percent and financing possible shortfalls from costless supplementary contributions. In order to meet the cost restriction, some equity investments totaling 10 percent are
still required to exploit excess returns. Otherwise, contribution volatility might be reduced
even further.

5. Conclusions

Most public pensions in the developed world are unfunded, noncontributory, and taxsponsored defined benefit plans. These represent a substantial, and at present, mostly unrecognized liability to taxpayers, one which threatens to grow as the workforce ages. Against
this backdrop, we evaluate ways to fund newly accrued pension benefits for the civil service
pension of the German state of Hesse, allowing the plan manager to invest fund assets in the
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capital market, using strategic contribution and investment patterns that minimize contribution rate volatility while controlling for overall pension costs with respect to a CVaR cost
constraint. We show that controlling only for costs results in high regular contribution rates,
of about 40 percent of covered payroll. Controlling only on contribution rate volatility yields
more moderate contribution rates and low-risk asset allocations, but high supplementatry
transfers to fill shortfalls. Combining both approaches results in moderate contribution rates
paired with substantial equity holdings.
This research should be of interest to policymakers across Europe and the Americas,
inasmuch as many of their public sector plans face substantial funding shortfalls. Plan managers should also be interested, as we have proved under plausible assumptions that they can
identify and implement a sensible balancing act between investment in equities and contribution policies, while protecting taxpayers from undue risk. A key message is that investing in
pure bond portfolios, which represents the status quo investment policy for the handful of
currently partially-funded German pension schemes, may not be the best way to exploit capital markets. Yet investing public pension money 60 percent or more in equities, as is true for
many US state pension plans, will prove too aggressive when future taxpayer consequences
are properly accounted.
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Table 1: Simulation Model Parameters for Stochastic Asset Case
Expected Returns
Base case
Low return
scenario
scenario
Equities
Bonds

6.57%
4.08%

5.07%
2.58%

Correlations
Standard
deviations

Equities

Bonds

23.4%
7.02%

1
0.17

1

Source: Authors’ calculations.

Table 2: Influence of Spread Period on Optimal Contribution and Investment Patterns
Spread period m (in years)
10
20
50
(2)
(3)
(4)
13.0
13.4
13.9
42.2
40.9
39.9
57.8
59.1
60.1

∞
(5)
14.1
39.4
60.6

(1)
(2)
(3)

Normal contributions (in %)
Equity weight (in %)
Bond weight (in %)

1
(1)
23.0
45.0
55.0

(4)

Contribution rate volatility p.a. (in %)

3.24

1.38

1.25

1.14

1.09

(5)
(6)

1%-CVaR pension costs (in € bn)
Expected pension costs (in € bn)

20.80
-0.62

20.80
2.74

20.80
3.20

20.80
3.29

20.80
3.31

Notes: Optimal contribution and investment patterns for various spread periods. Penalty factors on funding deviations ξ1 = ξ2 = 0.2; High return scenario. Source: Authors’ calculations.

Table 3: Contribution Rates for Selected Years
Spread
Period

Year
1
(1)

Year
10
(2)

Year
20
(3)

Year
30
(4)

Year
40
(5)

Year
50
(6)

Panel 1: Expected Contribution Rates (in %)
(1)
1
23.0
14.5
(2)
10
13.0
15.6
(3)
20
13.4
15.2
(4)
50
13.9
14.9
(5)
∞
14.1
14.9

9.3
10.8
12.0
13.0
13.4

4.0
5.0
6.0
7.5
8.4

1.6
2.3
2.7
3.5
4.1

0.9
1.2
1.4
1.7
1.9

Panel 2: 95%-Quantile Contribution Rates (in %)
(6)
1
23.0
47.1
(7)
10
13.0
20.7
(8)
20
13.4
18.2
(9)
50
13.9
16.7
(10)
∞
14.1
16.3

59.7
25.6
21.8
19.2
18.2

29.5
22.9
20.1
18.4
17.7

0.0
17.7
16.5
15.7
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Notes: Expected and worst-case overall contribution rates in percent of payroll in respective period in
various years for various spread periods. Penalty factors on funding deviations ξ1 = ξ2 = 0.2; High return
scenario. Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Appendix: Quarterly VAR Parameters
rm,t
Parameter estimates
rm,t+1
-0.0338
xe,t+1
0.1267
xb,t+1
-0.1710
dpt+1
-0.0099
sprt+1
0.0467
rnom,t+1
-0.0268

xe,t

xb,t

dpt

sprt

rnom,t

0.0035
0.0116
-0.0176
0.0012
0.0005
0.0010

-0.0226
0.0920
0.1106
-0.0094
0.0458
-0.0173

-0.2118
1.9727
-0.3946
0.9274
-0.0196
0.0434

-0.0350
0.5572
0.9146
-0.0169
0.9729
-0.0869

0.5455
-2.8218
1.5958
0.0464
0.3110
0.7718

3.00
0.12
-0.42
0.12

0.30
-0.10
0.23

0.62
-0.35

0.15

Error correlation matrix
rm,t
0.54
xe,t
-0.05
11.55
xb,t
0.19
-0.07
dpt
0.06
-0.87
sprt
0.01
0.05
rnom,t
0.21
-0.16

Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 1: Worst-Case Pension Cost Outcomes: Present Value of 1%-CVaR Costs (€ bn).

Notes: Base case assumes spread period of 20 years; a 3% real discount rate; penalty factors on funding deviations ξ1 = ξ2 = 0.2; high
return scenario. Source: Authors’ computations.

Figure 2: Pension Contribution Rate Volatility (%)

Notes: Base case assumes spread period of 20 years; a 3% real discount rate; penalty factors on funding deviations ξ1 = ξ2 = 0.2; high
return scenario. Source: Authors’ computations.
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Figure 3: Pension Manager’s Optimal Contribution and Investment Strategy Indifference Map

Notes: Base case assumes spread period of 20 years; a 3% real discount rate; penalty factors on funding deviations ξ1 = ξ2 = 0.2; high
return scenario. Source: Authors’ computations.

Figure 4: Total Pension Contribution Rate Profile over Time (%)
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Notes: Total pension contributions as a percent of payroll by period.
Base case assumes spread period of 20 years; a 3% real discount
rate; penalty factors on funding deviations ξ1 = ξ2 = 0.2; high return
scenario. Source: Authors’ computations.

